- Roche, B. & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2003). Behavior analysis and social constructionism: Some points of contact and departure. The Behavior Analyst 26, 215-231.
- Gilbert, G.N. & Mulkay, M. (1982). Warranting scientific belief. Social Studies of Science 12, 383-408.
385: Isn’t this how we all do it in convo?—they’re wrong cuz they aren’t looking at facts. I’m actually surprised so far that it’s so simple and relatable to everyday conversation. When someone believes something that is wrong, I feel like I come up with a whole host of reasons why they have come to such a conclusion. When I was younger, I would of course just say someone was stupid. As I grew older, I would say they didn’t pay attention to relevant evidence. These days I can pretty much accept that right and wrong are informed by perception, worldview, who you grew up around, etc. Even with my somewhat post-modern stance, I still catch myself, when people are “wrong,” saying things like, “They are distracted.” Meaning they are distracted from focusing on the evidence that would “correct” their “error.”
p. 390: The scientists are talking about how the evidence is stacking up in favor of one particular theory. I don’t know that the authors are arguing against this process, but many people conducting experiements in a similar way and getting similar results, to me, seems like a good way to create models/metaphors/stories that tell us, to the best of our knowledge, how the world works. I know that scientists work in labs with a desire to make things work, rather than some altruistic desire to find Truth. However, when dozens of specialist scientists are all working around a few theories and they eventually come to a consensus, I find it reasonable to accept that. I suppose the authors aren’t arguing against accepting scientific consensus, they’re just demonstrating how scientists talk about competing theories.
p. 392: So they accept data, but are skeptical of theory. This is similar to the idea in media of “giving the facts.” We don’t want the frilly theory stuff, just the evidence.
P393: Here I see a kind of parallel to the preffered and unpreferred response thing: when it’s right, you just say the evidence supports it. When it’s wrong, you talk about the evidence at length and hem and haw over it—and just as a person would be seen as rude for turning down an invitation with a simple “no,” a scientist would be seen as unscientific if she said “that’s just wrong.”
This was a good one!
- Lester, J. (2011). Exploring the borders of cognitive and discursive psychology: A methodological reconceptualization of cognition and discourse. Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology 10(3), 280-293.
- Edwards, D. (2006). Discourse, cognition and social practices: the rich surface of language and interaction. Discourse Studies 8(1), 41-49.
I like that he acknowledges the fact that language isn’t everything, but talk is what makes those non-talk things accountable. As we mentioned in class, we usually don’t stop to ask someone about what they intend, or even sometimes how they feel, unless there is some sort of hiccup.
Top of p. 43: So what does he think of poetry? The whole point of poetry, for me, is to combine surface with depth, literal with symbolic.
W/his punching the window example, I’m almost convinced of his point that it doesn’t matter whether or not the guy originally intended to punch the window out. That is unknowable to everyone. What is knowable is the interaction that the cop and accused have, and that power struggle and conversation is the only thing that brings out the intentionality—but it doesn’t bring it out as reality, only as an interaction.